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Question

Catastrophe Insurance, Capital Markets and Uninsurable Risks
by
Dwight M. Jaffee
Thomas Russell
1. Introduction
Catastrophes, according to Zeckhauser [1995], “provide a principal justification for insurance.One pays premiums to secure financial protection against low-probability high-consequence,events — what we normally label catastrophes.”
Principal justification or not, it is clear that private insurance markets are currently having a difficult time providing coverage for catastrophe risk. In California, for example, where earthquake coverage must be offered as an option on homeowner’s policies, companies representing 93% of the homeowner’s insurance market either stopped writing homeowner’s insurance or imposed strict limits on the policies they were willing to sell after the Northridge earthquake in 1994. [California: Dept. of Insurance Survey May 1, 1995].
In Florida, insurance company withdrawal from the state has been prevented only by a legal moratorium on exit. In many states (e.g. California, Florida, Texas, Hawaii), public officials now take it for granted that if catastrophe insurance is to be available at all, it must be provided by a public agency either State or Federal.
Catastrophes have thus become what insurance textbook writers call an ‘uninsurable risk’.The purpose of this paper is to examine what it is about catastrophe risk which makes it uninsurable. The paper argues that there is nothing in the nature of catastrophe risk as such which prevents the operation of a private market in insurance. In particular, large as the damage from a catastrophe event may be, it is infrequent, local, and unlikely to be correlated with the price of a global market index, so it is certainly diversifiable.
For example, even if every 20 years (on average) a $50 billion earthquake occurs somewhereon one of California’s many fault lines, ex ante we do not know where this event will occur. If we assume that say 5 million households are at risk from this event, it is sufficient for the insurance industry to collect an annual premium of $500/household/year to break even. (Assuming for simplicity no allowance for administrative costs or time value of money). Taking the long view, risk sharing seems eminently possible in this case.
What then prevents the operation of a private market? We will argue that to be viable a private insurance market must solve not a ‘point in time’ risk spreading problem, but rather an intertemporal problem of how to match a smooth flow of annual premium receipts to a highly non-smooth flow of annual loss payments. This is a capital market problem, not an insurance market problem, and we will argue that current institutional arrangements are not conducive to its solution. This, however, does not preclude a private market based on different institutional arrangements, and we examine some proposals which could allow private markets profitably to re-enter the catastrophe line.

Answer 1

巨灾保险，资本市场和不可予以保险的风险
通过
德怀特先生雅菲
托马斯拉塞尔
1 。导言
灾难，据泽克豪泽[ 1995 ] ， “提供了一个主要理由insurance.One支付保险费，以确保金融保护，防止低概率高的后果，事件-就是我们通常标签的灾难。 ”
主要理由或没有，很明显，私营保险市场，目前有困难的时候提供覆盖灾害风险。在加利福尼亚州，例如，在地震保险必须提供的一种选择的房屋的政策，公司占93 ％的业主保险市场要么停止写业主保险或施加严格限制的政策，他们愿意出售后的北岭地震1994年。 [加州：系保险调查1995年5月1日] 。
在佛罗里达州，保险公司撤出该国已被阻止只能由法律暂停出口。在许多国家（如加利福尼亚州，佛罗里达州，得克萨斯州，夏威夷） ，公职人员现在认为理所当然，如果巨灾保险是可以在所有的，它必须是所提供的公共机构或者国家或联邦。
灾难就此成为保险教科书编写者叫'承保风险。本文的目的是审查什么是灾难风险，使保险。报告指出，没有任何性质的灾难风险，例如防止运作的私营保险市场。特别是，大的损害从灾难事件可能是，这是罕见的，地方和不太可能相关的价格，全球市场指数，因此它肯定是分散。
例如，即使每20年（平均） 500亿美元地震发生somewhereon之一加州的许多断层线，事前我们不知道这一事件会发生。如果我们假设说五百点○○○万家庭有可能从这一事件，这是足够的保险业，收集每年保险费为500/household/year收支平衡。 （假设为简单没有津贴的行政费用或时间值的钱） 。以长远来看，风险分担似乎非常有可能在这种情况下。
那么防止经营私人市场？我们将认为是可行的私营保险市场必须解决不是一个时间点的风险蔓延的问题，而是一个跨问题是如何匹配一条畅通的每年保费收据高度不畅通的年度亏损付款。这是一个资本市场的问题，而不是一个保险市场的问题，我们将认为，目前的体制安排，不利于它的解决办法。然而，这并不妨碍私人市场根据不同的体制安排，我们研究的一些建议，可能会允许私营市场盈利重新进入灾难线。